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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE REFERENCE 
TO THE DITCH IN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WARDS' 
WARRANTY DEED GOVERNS THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION IN MR. 
KHALSA'S WARRANTY DEED 
A. The Wards5 Notice Argument Is Circular, and Only Begs the 
Underlying Question - Whose Legal Description of the Common 
Border Governs? 
Mr. Khalsa's opening appeal brief points to the identical metes and bounds of the 
common border between the parties legally described in the parties' respective warranty 
deeds as indicating their common grantor's intent in selling the two parcels. In response, 
the Wards claim that the legal description in Mr. Khalsa's Warranty Deed (Exhibit A 
attached to the Brief of Appellant) is irrelevant because he supposedly had notice of the 
Wards' ownership of the land in question pursuant to the Wards' Uniform Real Estate 
Purchase Contract ("Purchase Contract), which was recorded prior to Mr. Khalsa's 
Warranty Deed. 
This argument, however, is circular. Mr. Khalsa may have had notice of the 
Wards' Purchase Contract pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-3-102(1), but of what exactly does the 
Wards' Purchase Contract give him notice? The Wards' notice argument follows that the 
Purchase Contract gives Mr. Khalsa actual notice of the legal description contained 
therein (which is the same legal description of the Wards' Warranty Deed)1. However, 
1
 Compare the legal description in the Purchase Contract [R. at 159, ffl[ 2-4; R. at 147, Yi 
2-4] to the legal description in the Wards' Warranty Deed (attached to the Brief of Appellant as 
Exhibit B). 
1 
comparing the legal description of Mr. Khalsa's Warranty Deed to the legal description of 
the Wards' property in their Purchase Contract yields the same metes and bounds (or 
distances and bearings) of their common border. Thus, looking at the legal description of 
the Wards' Warranty Deed or Purchase Contract at the time Mr. Khalsa bought his 
neighboring parcel, Mr. Khalsa would have assumed that because his Warranty Deed 
contains the same metes and bounds of the common border with the Wards, there was no 
I 
conflict, and any reference to the ditch was extraneous. The Wards would of course 
claim that Mr. Khalsa had notice of the legal description reference to "along a ditch" in 
the Purchase Contract which the Wards would claim governs. However, such is the 
present dispute between the parties - i.e. does the identical metes and bounds in both 
legal descriptions govern or does the! phrase "along a ditch" in the Wards' legal 
description govern? Thus, the Wards' notice argument is circular, leading the Court right 
to where it otherwise is in this appeal - i.e. how to construe the parties' warranty deed 
legal descriptions. 
Furthermore, the Wards appear to use U.C A. § 57-3-102(1) to require Mr. Khalsa 
to not only do a title search on his property and the chain-of-title leading up to the 
purchase of his property, but the Wards would also have Mr. Khalsa do a title search of 
all the parcels of property adjacent to his property (including the Wards' parcel). In 
effect, the Wards would required Mr. Khalsa to investigate and inspect the chain-of-title 
and legal descriptions of all the land adjacent to his. Rather than cite any supporting 
caselaw for this expansive view of recorded notice, the Wards simply rely on one case -
2 
Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1974). The Wilson 
court, however, fails to resolve the present dispute at bar because in its brief, one-page 
decision, it fails to provide the legal descriptions of the two overlapping properties. 
Apparently, the legal description in Wilson must have contained a standard metes and 
bounds legal description with no conflicting, extra language such as is contained in the 
Wards' Warranty Deed. Further, the legal descriptions of the parties in Wilson must not 
have described a common border so that the later-recording party, doing a title search, 
would have noticed the lack of a commonly-described border. Indeed, the Wilson court 
omits all of these facts which would have be determinative to the present dispute. Thus, 
Wilson fails to resolve the dispute at bar. 
At the very least, the legal description in the Wards' Purchase Contract and 
Warranty Deed is ambiguous, begging the question: does the Eastern boundary of the 
Wards' property track along metes and bounds or the ditch? Accordingly, the Wards' 
notice argument is of no avail as it is circular and fails to aid the Court in deciding this 
appeal. 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling Incorrectly Interprets Utah Law and 
Applicable Cannons of Deed Construction 
1. The Wards' Deed Construction Preference Ignores the Overall 
Rule of Giving Effect to the Grantor's Intent 
The Wards rely on the canon of deed construction which holds that monument 
calls govern conflicting courses and distances. The Wards' reliance on this cannon of 
construction, however, ignores the critical inquiry - what did the grantor, Mr. Ellsworth, 
3 
intend to grant? To divine Mr. Ellsworth's intent requires the Court to review the legal 
descriptions in the parties' warranty deeds (because his testimony by affidavit or 
deposition is unavailable). Because the legal description in the Wards' Warranty Deed 
fails to solve the ambiguity of what Mr. Ellsworth intended the Eastern boundary of the 
Wards' property to be, the Court must compare the Wards' Warranty Deed to Mr. 
Khalsa's Warranty Deed. Because both warranty deeds contain the same course and 
descriptions for the common boundary, but only the Wards' Warranty Deed refers to the 
ditch, it is reasonable to conclude the Mr. Ellsworth intended the common boundary 
between the parcels to be the boundary described by the metes and bounds of both 
warranty deeds. Ths conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that deleting the 
reference in the Wards' Warranty Deed to the ditch does not effect the description to the 
common border. In other words, the legal description in both Warranty Deeds stands 
independent of the ditch reference in the Wards' Warranty Deed. 
The intent of the grantor was the focus of the court in Neeley v. Kelschu 600 P.2d 
979 (Utah 1979), when it stated the principle: 
[w]hen the face of a deed shows the intention was to convey a specific quantity of 
land and the metes and bound would give that quantity, but a reference to a 
monument would embrace more or less than that quantity, the metes and bounds 
description should be followed. 
Id. at 982 (emphasis added). Further indicative of the intent of the grantor, according to 
Neeley, is the "quantity of land" conveyed. In Neeley, the common grantor testified that 
it was her intent to have conveyed the disputed land to Kelsch. However, the Neeley 
court looked at the acreage such a conveyance would have created for Kelsch - i.e. 23 
4 
acres - versus the acreage provided for in the warranty deed at issue - i.e. 15 acres - and 
concluded that insufficient evidence exists to establish that the grantor intended to convey 
the disputed land to Kelsch. Id. at 982. Similarly, as set forth in the Brief of Appellant, 
the Wards' Warranty Deed gives them only 6.31 acres, but because the Trial Court 
awarded the disputed half acre to the Wards, the Trial Court's award of summary 
judgment increases the Wards' acreage to 6.89 acres. In response, the Wards claim that 
references to amounts of acreage conveyed is imprecise and thus unreliable. Although 
acreage by itself is not the preferred cannon to construe a deed, it nevertheless sheds light 
on the grantor's intent. 
Further, the common law exception set forth in the Brief of Appellant supports the 
cannon that the intent of the grantor is paramount. 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 61 
(holding that an inferior means of location may control a higher one when it is apparent 
that a mistake exists with respect to the calls; in such case the controlling call is that most 
consistent "with the apparent intent of the grantor."). The Wards attempt to distinguish 
this exception by distinguishing Neeley again. However, this common law exception is a 
principle of law, not a rule, and as such, it applies to different factual situations. Thus, 
just because the present case is not factually identical to Neeley does not impugn the 
applicability of the Neeley common law exception to the present case.2 
2
 The other common law exception found in 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 64 
similarly applies in cases of clear mistake, "where some other sufficient reason exists for 
disregarding the general rule, as where it is apparent from the instrument that boundaries 
are to be determined by means of location other than the monument." Section 64 does not 
5 
Next, the Wards borrow from the aforementioned common law exceptions by 
claiming that disregarding the "along a ditch" language in their warranty deed would 
result in an absurdity. The Wards claim that Mr. Ellsworth could not have intended to 
exclude the disputed piece of land from his sale of property to the Wards (and later 
convey it to Mr. Khalsa5s predecessors-in-interest) because such would supposedly result 
in the absurdity that if the disputed strip is given to Mr. Khalsa, it is uphill from the ditch 
in question, and thus un-irrigatable. Although it may have been the Wards5 intent to use 
their property to grow crops, not all land owners of large tracts of land so desire to use 
their land as the Wards. In fact, Mr. Khalsa (a businessman, not a farmer) intends to 
commercially develop his land. Setting that aside, there is no evidence of record 
indicating the use of Mr. Khalsa5 s predecessors-in-interest. Thus, just because Mr. 
Khalsa or his predecessors-in-interest might use the disputed strip of land differently than 
the Wards does not equate to an absurd use. 
One Utah case overlooked to date is Gillmor v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 
(Utah App. 1995), which divined the intent of the grantor by focusing on the specific 
language in the vesting deed: 
The [legal] description in question says 'to a point.5 'The words 'to a point9 
indicate that the limit is not set by a physical feature, but by a theoretical 
location.' Stephen V. Estopinal, A Guide to Understanding Land Surveys 171 
(1989). If the deed description had intended to use the road to define the 
boundaryy as asserted by Cummings, the description would have followed the 
solely apply to conflicts between more than one monument as indicated in the Brief of 
Appellees. 
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east side of the road to the point of beginning rather than calling to a point 3 
rods east of the quarter corner. Here, the deed refers to the section quarter corner 
and follows from that, not from the road. 
(Emphasis added). Similarly, the Wards5 legal description in their Warranty Deed 
because at a point ("Commencing at a point located South . . . ) and ends at the same 
point, indicating that "If the [Ward's Warranty Deed] description had intended to use the 
[ditch] to define the boundary, as asserted by Cummings, the [Wards' legal] description 
would have followed the [ditch] to the point of beginning." 
Finally, although different in facts, Laflin Borough v. Yatesville Borough, 422 
A.2d 1186 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1979) supports the overarching principle that "the call 
adopted as the controlling one should be the [m]ost consistent with the apparent intent of 
the partiesr Id at 1187. 
Accordingly, the Wards' preferred deed construction ignores the paramount 
cannon of construction requiring courts to give effect to the intent of the grantor. 
2. The Wards5 Supporting Caselaw is Distinguishable 
The Wards rely on a number of cases in support of their claim that the cannon of 
deed construction holding that a monument controls over a course and distance governs 
the present case. These cases, however, are inapplicable to the present action. 
The Wards claim that Mahas v. Rindlisbacher. 808 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1990) is 
applicable because the legal descriptions in Mahas refers to a canal. As previously set 
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forth in the Brief of Appellant, only the Wards' Warranty Deed refers to a ditch, whereas 
both vesting deeds in Mahas refers to a canal. Further, the calls to the canal in both the 
legal descriptions at issue in Mahas stand alone, without also calling to a course and 
direction. For example, the Mahas plaintiffs legal description reads in pertinent part: 
. . .running thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27 [degrees] West to Canal; 
thence Southeasterly along said canal to a point North 15 [degrees] Eas t . . . 
Id. at 1026. The Mahas defendant's legal description similarly reads in pertinent part: 
. . . thence North 27 [degrees] East 12.00 chains, more or less, to a canal; thence 
Southeasterly along canal to a point North 15 [degrees] east 10.18 chains from the 
County Road . . . 
Id. Both of these legal descriptions expressly call to a canal, without which, both legal 
descriptions would be incomprehensible. The Wards claim that "[r]emoving the 
reference to the canal or ditch in [the Mahas legal descriptions] would still allow for the 
surveyor to complete the survey." (See, Brief of Appellees at 24). Such is impossible. 
Removing the reference to the canal in the Mahas plaintiffs legal description would 
yield: 
. . .running thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27 [degrees] West to []; thence 
Southeasterly [] to a point North 15 [degrees] East. . . 
Without the necessary call to the canal, the Mahas plaintiffs legal description is missing 
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an entire boundary.3 Contrast the canal call in the Mahas legal descriptions to the ditch 
reference in the Wards' legal description: 
. . . thence North 89°55?01M East along a fence line 453.38 feet (138.19 meters); 
thence South 07°54'36M West along a ditch 680.80 feet (207.51 meters) to 
the point of beginning. 
The Wards' legal description not only refers to a ditch, but also gives a course and 
distance along the same boundary of the property. Omitting the reference to ditch does 
not render the legal description incomprehensible. 
The Wards claim this distinction is irrelevant because Mr. Khalsa supposedly had 
notice based on the Wards' previously recorded Purchase Contract (or Warranty Deed). 
However, as stated above, the Wards' notice argument is circular and unavailing. 
Next, the Wards rely on Williams v. Oldrovd 581 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978). As noted 
earlier in the Brief of Appellant, Williams is inapplicable to the present case because it 
involved only one vesting deed - from a grantor to a grantee - not two vesting deeds of 
neighboring grantees (as is the situation in the present case). Based on this, the Williams 
court did not have the benefit of two vesting deeds describing a common boundary with 
3
 The Wards concluded that even without the call in the Mahas legal descriptions 
to a canal, a surveyor could complete the survey because the old canal was unknown. 
(See, Brief of Appellee at 24). However, there was a fence line that ran along the old 
canal. Id. at 1026. And, if the fence line was used as the boundary, both legal 
descriptions "close and harmonize with each other." IdL Thus, just because the location 
of the old canal was unknown does not mean that any surveyor could have plotted the 
Mahas properties from legal descriptions omitting the canal reference. 
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metes and bounds to help it divine the grantor's intent. The Wards' only response to this 
critical difference is a footnote reference to their circular notice argument. 
Finally, the Wards also rely on Scott v. Hansea 422 P.2d 525 (Utah 1966), but 
ignore the distinguishing fact in Scott that the boundary dispute there involved only one 
vesting deed, not two like is the situation in the present case. Further, the call to a road in 
Scott is necessary to have a complete legal description in that case. Omitting the call in 
Scott to the road leaves that vesting deed incomprehensible, which would not be the 
situation in the present case. 
Accordingly, the caselaw relied on by the Trial Court and the Wards is 
distinguishable and inapplicable to the case at bar. 
C. The Wards' Testimony Regarding Mr. Ellsworth's Intent is Hearsay 
Focusing on the critical issue of intent, the Wards assert that Mr. Ellsworth 
supposedly intended the ditch to be the Eastern boundary of the Wards' parcel. The 
Wards support this claim by arguing that "they agreed with Ellsworth that the eastern 
boundary would be the Epperson Ditch." (See, Brief of Appellees at 28). However, this 
argument is based solely on one paragraph in the Wards' affidavits in which they testify 
that: 
Prior to our purchase of the Ward Parcel on July 4, 1978, [the Wards] had 
discussions with Mr. Ellsworth about the property that we would be purchasing. 
During these discussions, we agreed that the boundary between the Ward Parcel 
and Mr. Ellsworth's remaining land would be the Epperson ditch. 
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[R. at 158, Tf 6; R. at 146, ^  6.] To the extent these paragraphs from the Wards' affidavits 
refer to what Mr. Ellsworth agreed upon, or imply that he consented or said anything in 
support of their understanding, such is hearsay. At best, the Wards can only testify as to 
their intent and understanding, not the intent and understanding of Mr. Ellsworth. 
Because we have no affidavits or deposition testimony of Mr. Ellsworth, at present his 
intent can only be derived from the parties' warranty deeds. 
Accordingly, the representations as to Mr. Ellsworth's intent contained in the 
Wards' affidavits, is inadmissible hearsay and should not be considered by this Court. 
D. Mr. Khalsa Has Previously Raised the Claim That the Wards5 Legal 
Description Is Ineffective Because it Does Not Close, and Said Claim Is 
Properly Supported by Evidence 
On page three of his Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Mr. Khalsa argued: 
Furthermore, note that the length of the common border between the two 
parcels in question is exactly 680.8 feet - in both legals. Now, if the language 
"along a ditch'* is erased, nothing changes. The bearings and distance are still in 
agreement. Thus, "along a ditch" is extraneous and does not affect the bearing and 
distance of the common border. 
On the other hand, concluding that the common border tracks "along the 
ditch" as Defendants claim, would not only contradict the straight line and specific 
distance in Defendants' legal description, but would vitiate the identical bearing 
and distance in Plaintiffs legal description. In other words, the two legal 
descriptions would not "close.55 In order for the two legals to "close,55 the only 
possible reading of "along a ditch55 (so as to harmonize it with the otherwise 
identical bearings and distances of the common boundary) is to interpret "along a 
ditch55 to mean that the common boundary described by the identical bearings and 
distances in the two legals generally follows along the line of the ditch. To hold 
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otherwise would require the Court to reform Plaintiffs warranty deed by adding 
"along a ditch" into Plaintiffs legal, or to vitiate the identical bearings and 
distances in Defendants' and Plaintiffs legal (as set forth above). 
[R. at 161.] Thus, Mr. Khalsa clearly raised his closure argument below. Further, the 
inability of the Wards' legal description (if the "along a ditch" language is used) to close 
is evidenced by the surveyor's plot of the parties' properties and the ditch in Exhibit C 
attached to the Brief of Appellant.4 In fact, the illustrative drawing on page eight of the 
Brief of Appellees shows the same thing - i.e. the land circumscribed between the 
contours of the ditch and the common boundary between the properties does not touch the 
northern or southern boundaries of either of the parties' properties. Put another way, said 
circumscribed land is floating between the northern and southern boundaries - it does not 
close.5 
Thus, relying on "along a ditch" as the proper construction of the Wards' Warranty 
Deed (and the common boundary between the parties' properties) results in an inability to 
4
 The Wards claim that surveyor Bing Christensen's affidavit, to which the plot is 
attached, is somehow irrelevant to (or is an improper basis for) Mr. Khalsa's claim 
because Mr. Christensen gave effect to the "course bearings and distances" in the legal 
descriptions of the parties' warranty deeds and supposedly did not give effect to the ditch. 
This claim, however, makes no sense in that the surveyor plotted the ditch on his plot of 
the parties' properties. (See, Exhibit C attached to Brief of Appellant). That is all Mr. 
Khalsa relies on the surveyor for - the plot of the properties and the ditch and the acreage 
of the disputed strip of land. 
5
 Thus, the Wards' claim that the course and distance calls in both the Wards' and 
Mr. Khalsa's legal descriptions start and end at the Epperson Ditch (see. Brief of 
Appellees at 3) is incorrect. 
12 
close the boundaries of the parties' properties. Surely, this was not the intent of Mr. 
Ellsworth. 
E. Alternatively, Issues of Fact Exist as to Mr. Ellsworth's Intent Which 
Preclude Summary Judgment 
The Wards take umbrage at Mr. Khalsa's claim that issues of fact exist as to Mr. 
Ellsworth's intent that preclude summary judgment in favor of the Wards. Although Mr. 
Khalsa has argued that based on the two Warranty Deeds, the Trial Court should have 
awarded Mr. Khalsa summary judgment (and this Court should too). Alternatively, if this 
Court is not so inclined to rule, it should nonetheless reverse the Trial Court's award of 
summary judgment in favor of the Wards because issues of fact exist as to Mr. 
Ellsworth's intent vis-a-vis the correct legal description of the common border. There is 
nothing inconsistent with such alternative arguments which attorneys routinely make. 
As stated above, the Wards' hearsay claim as to Mr. Ellsworth's intent is 
inadmissible. Mr. Khalsa does not dispute what the Wards may have understood their 
Eastern boundary to be at the time they purchased their land. Naturally, the Wards claim 
that their understanding was and is that the ditch is the correct boundary between the 
parties' properties. But, their intent does not govern. Mr. Ellsworth's intent governs. 
This Court can certainly take notice that the Wards' claim as to what Mr. Ellsworth 
intended (at the time they bought their property from Mr. Ellsworth) is hearsay, which 
should not be relied upon by the Court. 
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Accordingly and in the alternative, issues of fact exist regarding Mr. Ellsworth's 
intent. The Trial Court's award of summary judgment to the Wards should thus be 
reversed and this case should be remanded back to the Trial Court for further disposition. 
II. THE WARDS5 BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CLAIM IS 
INAPPLICABLE 
The Wards argue that their boundary by acquiescence claim creates issues of fact 
precluding the Court from reversing the Trial Court and awarding Mr. Khalsa summary 
judgment. This claim is without merit. 
For a court to quiet title in a parcel of property based on boundary by 
acquiescence, the party claiming title to property under said doctrine must establish: "(0 
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, [and] (iv) by 
adjoining landowners." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, <ft 16. "If the party attempting to 
establish boundary by acquiescence fails to satisfy any one of the elements of the 
doctrine, the boundary is defeated." Id, at ^ 16. (emphasis in the original). 
The Wards' boundary by acquiescence claim fails because there are no issues of 
fact as to their inability to establish the fourth element which requires that the Wards 
owned the land for 20 consecutive years. The Wards attempt to establish this 20 year 
period with their Purchase Contract which they recorded on September 12, 1980. 
However, the Wards' 20-year period would not begin until they became legal owners 
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pursuant to their Warranty Deed recorded in 1987. 
The Wards' 1987 Warranty Deed governs this issue because it establishes that they 
became legal owners at that time. Although the Wards had a recorded contract prior to 
1987, such did not give them legal ownership. They could have, at any time under the 
contract, stopped paying and just walked away. The Wards have not provided the Trial 
Court or this Court any caselaw providing them legal ownership of the disputed land 
based solely on an executory contract. Also, according to the Purchase Contract, 
Defendants' monthly payments consisted of principal and interest, but no taxes. [R at 
147.] Thus, Mr. Ellsworth was paying the taxes on the Wards' land until he legally 
conveyed it to them in 1987. Had Mr. Ellsworth defaulted on paying taxes, the 
government would have pursued him, not the Wards. 
In sum, Defendants' boundary by acquiescence claim fails the 20-year ownership 
requirement and therefore is inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, the Court should reverse the Trial Court's award of 
summary judgment in favor of the Wards, and instead award Mr. Khalsa summary 
judgment by holding that the correct boundary between the parties' properties is the metes 
and bounds description contained in both parties' warranty deeds, not the ditch referred to 
in the Wards' Warranty Deed. 
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